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CAPTIVE COAL AND EXEMPTIONS FROM PRICE
REGULATION: BITUMINOUS COAL ACT OF 1937
SECTION 4-II-(1) of the Bituminous Coal Act of 19371 exempts from
Code regulation all "coal consumed by the producer or . . . transported
by the producer to himself for consumption by him." Designed to exclude
from the minimum price provisions of the Act coal extracted from so-called
"captive" mines, this section appears destined to be the first, and perhaps
an ever-widening, loophole in the legislation regulating the coal industry.
The ambiguous terms of the provision have left its scope undetermined. A
current problem for judicial determination, therefore, is the classification oi
the various "captive" arrangements as exempt or non-exempt within its
purview.
In the trade use of the term, "captive" coal is all coal other than that
produced for sale in the open market; a "captive" producer is generally
regarded as a consumer owning or controlling a coal mine, and consuming
its output.2 Prior to federal regulation of the coal industry, numerous con-
sumers seeking to obtain regular, low-cost supplies of coal of uniform quality
became "captive" producers.3 The immediate decision of a coal consumer
1. 50 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U. S. C. § 828-851 (Supp. 1939) , extended to April 26,
1943, Pub. L. No. 34, 77th Cong., 1st Sess, (Apr. 11, 1941). (Further citations to the Act
will refer to the section number only.) Cf. SEN. REP. No. 169, 77th Cong., ist Sess,
(1941) 3: Acceptance of the bill as it passed the House "is not intended either
expressly or by implication, as ratification or approval in any respect of the interpretation
of the Act by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case [Powell v. Gray, note 22 infra] in question."
2. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 357, n. 1 (1933)
Miller, The Pricing of Bituminous Coal: Some International Comparisons in Fultmicit
& MASON, PUBLc POLICY (1940) 145; Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Comnilt,.e
on Interstate Commerce on S. 1417, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 53, 84 (cited hereafter as
Hearings). This definition is narrower than the following adopted by the Coal Division:
"mines in which the tonnage reported as 'controlled' sales and 'exempt' coal consti-
tuted 40% or more of the total output have been classified as 'captive' . . . for purposes
of statistical analysis only . . .not as an interpretation of Section 4, Part II (1)." Rvu-
vIsED DETAIL OF PRODUCING, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND SELLING COSTS -on TlE CALENDAR
YEAR 1940, Economics Branch, Bituminous Coal Division, No. 147850, June 25, August 19,
August 26, 1941. (The analysis covers all United States production but that in Colorado,
New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, Montana, and Washington). The Coal Conservation Act
of 1935, held unconstitutional in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936), although
making no captive exemption, defined captive coal to include "all coal produced at a
mine for consumption by the producer, or by a subsidiary or affiliate thereof . , ."
See § 19, 49 STAT. 991, 1008 (1935). The 1935 Act, however, contained labor provisions
as well as machinery for establishing minimum prices.
3. "There is a growing tendency for the users of coal to make sure their own sup-
plies. It is apparent all along the line from steel-mills to mail-order houses. It might
eventuate afterwhile in a complete dismemberment of the industry, and its apportionment
in bits large and small to the industries which it furnishes with power." HAMILTON &
WRIGHT, THE CASE OF BITUMINOUS COAL (1926) 193.
CAPTIVE COAL AND EXEMPTIONS
to buy, lease, or otherwise "capture" a source of coal for his own needs
necessarily involved a comparison of market prices and the cost at which
captive facilities were available to him. Uncertainties such as the future
course of market prices, the threats of unionism, the danger of shortages,
and other anticipations as to the development of the coal market directly
influenced the consumer's decision to undertake captive operations.4 Such
operations were more or less expensive than a policy of coal purchases,
depending on the relationship between the costs of captive coal and prices
in the market. The existence of large, untouched coal fields, and of many
mines with capacity to produce more than their current output,5 enabled
consumers to resort to captive sources and thus acted as a definite inhibi-
tion on price rises in the market.0 The history of the industry reveals that
captive facilities were acquired and utilized principally during boom periods,
the proportion of captive production decreasing during depressions, when
many captive producers shut up their own mines, and bought on the open
market more cheaply than they could produce.7
As a practical matter, the legal relationship of the captive mine to the
consumer assumed varied forms. Control of production facilities was often
obtained, for example, by the purchase or lease of coal lands or by the
acquisition of a security interest in an existing mining enterprise. Mining
operations were conducted through a variety of legal instrumentalities in-
cluding contracts of employment, forms of agency, and independent con-
tractor relations. Most frequent, however, was the use of subsidiary or
affiliate corporations, both to control facilities and to maintain operations.
4. Thus, it has been pointed out, the inability to obtain adequate supplies of raw
materials at reasonable prices which is consequent upon "boom" conditions stimulates
the consumer to expansion, along lines of supplying his own needs. See Roll:usow, Tin;
Smucrua OF CompETInvE INLTmsY " (1932) 129.
5. Unused resources and new coal fields, machine-mining and the multi-shift day
are the basic factors in creating the "menace of potential coal:' See Hm.ILTo'; &.
WRIGHT. op. cit. mtpra note 3, at 166-70; TNEC REP., Economiic STANDAPPS (OF Gt ,t';-
.IENT PRICE CoxTmOL, Monograph 32 (1941) Pt. III, pp. 238, 265.
6. "The problem of protecting the consumer against unreasonable advance in prices
is simplified in coal mining by the presence of competitive sources uf energy . .. and by
the alternative offered to the larger consumers of opening mines fur their own use. In-
dustrial consumers already supply a fourth of their own requirements from mines which
they control." Excerpt from a Report by the National Resources Committee, Hearinys on
S. 1417, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 386. Hence, while captive coal does not enter the
open market, it competes with all other coal as a potential method of supplying the con-
sumer's needs, to wit: "backward vertical integration." See Bt'CHANAN.-, THE E.o.o.'-
ICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE (1940) 307.
7. See TNEC REP., supra note 5, at 242-54, 266; P.sARo, Tim COAL INsULSvTI
(1940) 28, 38. In some cases, however, captive operation has been characterized by
intermittent "dumping." STAEBLER, THE CoAL Ac.-A CAsE StuDY IN PLANNIN6;
(1940) 7.
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Under the present Coal Act, "producer" is defined to include all persons
and firms "engaged in the business of mining coal." s The minimum price
provisions and the marketing rules and regulations established under the Code
are made inapplicable to transactions involving coal consumed by the pro-
ducer.0 The total "price" paid by the exempt captive producer for his coal
supply is therefore the sum of the costs of producing and transporting it.
In escaping the minimum price provisions of the Act he is relieved of meeting
a price level which depends on many elements other than cost, and specifi-
cally must allow for "taxes, insurance, . . royalties, depreciation, . . .
coal operators' association dues, district board assessments for Board oper-
ating expenses only levied under the Code, and reasonable costs of selling
and the costs of administration."' 10 If, however, exemption is denied, the
consumer must pay his supplier the minimum prices set tinder the Act.1 '
While this payment may be no more than a bookkeeping entry if the supplier
is a subsidiary or a branch of the consumer's business, the decision not to
allow exemption has other more serious consequences. The supplier must
pay substantial dues and assessments under the Code, 12 submit cost data
8. § 17(c). The denotation of the word "producer" ill the Act has not yet been
given a precise meaning for the purposes of the particular statute. Cf. Foss-Hughes Co.
v. Lederer, 287 Fed. 150 (E. D. Pa. 1919) ; see Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262
U. S. 172, 180 (1923).
9. By § 3(b) producers have the choice of accepting membership in the Coal Code,
and abiding by the regulations thereof, or paying the 19%/% tax upon the sale or other
disposal of coal "which would be subject to the application of the conditions al
provisions of the code . . ." Since producer-consumed coal transactions are not subject
to Code regulation, the 19y2 % tax is inapplicable, but apparently the I cent per ton tax
on the sale or other disposal, "the term 'disposal'" including "consumption or use . . .
by a producer," under §3(a), remains applicable. Cf. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 392 (1940).
10. §4-II-(a). Selling costs for coal sold in the open market in districts 1 to 15
ranged in 1940 from 5.74 cents per ton in district 2 to 29.6 cents per tol in district 14,
with an average selling cost per ton for districts 1 to 15 of 11.35 cents. District board
assessments under § 4-I-(b) in districts 1 to 15 for the last five months of 1940 amounted
to $831,201. During that time, production for these districts was roughly 175 million
tons. Statistics computed from totals in REVISED DETAIL OF PRODUCING, AMINISTRATIVE,
AND SELLING COSTS FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1940, op. cit. supra note 2. See TNEC
REP., supra note 5, at 266-67. In financial reports to stockholders, two private com-
panies reported total Code taxes and assessments of "approximately $200,000," on a ton-
nage estimated at 2,500,000 (Annual Report, 1940, Island Creek Coal Co., 8) and $66,000,
on an estimated 750,000 tons produced. (Annual Report, 1940, Pond Creek Pocahontag
Co., 5). Thus it was testified in the Hearings Bc!orc The Comnittee On Ways and
Means on H. J. Res. 101, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 6, "The industry has many mll-
lions of dollars invested in this Act. It has paid more than $15,000,000 in taxes levied by
the Act to defray administrative expenses. In addition it has paid assessments to itS
district boards and has incurred the expenses of hearings, lawyers' fees and so forth."
(Harold L. Ickes).
11. See §§3(b), 5(b)(4).
12. § 4-I-(b) ; see note 10 supra; ef. McLean Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh Terminal Corp.,
328 Pa. 250, 195 Atil. 4 (1937).
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and frequent reports of operations, and run the risk of lengthy and expen-
sive examination and cross-examination on issues relevant to the adminis-
trative process of setting minimum and now maximum prices.13 Where the
captive arrangement involves a parent-consumer and a subsidiary-supplier,
receipt of minimum price payments will probably render the subsidiary liable
for income taxes; in addition, income taxes on 15% of any dividends paid
by the subsidiary pursuant to its increased income will be assessed against
the parent. 14 This state of facts has created pressure in two directions: first,
captive producers already having control of mines have pressed insistently
for a liberal exemption-granting policy ;15 secondly, large consumers desirous
of obtaining the benefits of the exemption provision without the financial
responsibility of actually purchasing and operating a mine, have sought
captive arrangements with independent mine operators. Moreover, captive
arrangements may have definite advantages for the formerly independent
operator as well as for the consumer. Where, for example, he becomes an
agent-operator receiving payment on a tonnage basis, the lowered rate of
profit per ton is compensated for by a higher volume and more stable rate
of production,'0 and, consequently, higher ultimate profits measured with
reference to capitalY"
If the multitude of legal arrangements available to the prospective captive
producer were held exempt under the Coal Act, a serious interference with
its administration would result from increases in dues and assessments for
the operators who remain non-captive, and the disappearance of accurate
narketing cost data, the elements of which will be non-existent or merged
in the direct marketing "price." It is also obvious that the availability of
13. See Saxton Coal Mining Co. v. Coal Comm.. 96 F. (2d) 517 (App. D. C. 1938) ;
Utah Fuel Co. v. Coal Comm., 101 F. (2d) 426 (App. D. C. 1938), aff'd, 3 U. S. 56
(1939); Powbatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941). But all
producers remain subject to the report requirements of § 10, whether Code members ur
not. See Powbatan Mining Co. v. Jckes, id. at 108. However, the reports required of
Code members are much more comprehensive than those required of all producers. See
5 FED. REG. 1281, 2243, 2412, 3813 (1940) ; 6 FED. REG. 2451 (1941).
14. 53 STAT. 7, 18 (1939), 26 U. S. C. §§ 13(b), 26(b) (Supp. 1939). See Hear-
ings on S. 1. 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 26.
15. Applications for exemption on the grounds that particular transactions in coal
did not affect interstate commerce, or that the coal was captive within the exemption
provision, numbered 352 by February 20, 1940. Of these, 142 were withdrawn, 89 dis-
missed on stipulation, 36 granted, and 4 denied. 81 were still pending. Arr4_eu.EY G;UL-
ERAL's REPoRT ON ADmINISTRTIVE PROCEDURE, Monograph 23 (1940) Pt. II, p. 94.
16. "In times of high industrial activity the mines which are owned or controlled
by the consumer, either directly, or indirectly through stock ownership, operate more
steadily than mines selling coal on the commercial market." TNEC REP., supra note 5,
at 266. See NAT. REsOURCES Commas., EXmsGY REsOUrcEs A.D NATIONAL POLIcY (1939)
69.
17. See CLARK, TE EcONomics OF Ovnm-HL.% n Cosrs (1923) 347-352; TXEC
REP., supra note 5, at 237-42, 317; Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Intcrest
(1941) 50 YALE L. J. 543, 553.
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captive mines is a limitation upon the possibility of enforcing minimum prices
which much exceed the costs of extracting captive coal. Thus, in that respect,
all captive operations affect the administration of the minimum price schedule.
But the Act does not protect its minimum price plan by prohibiting con-
sumers of coal to own or to operate mines. On the contrary, it expressly
approves of some captive operations by exempting them. No attempt is made
to limit the number of exemptions.18 Testimony of the drafters of the statute
and omission of any provision to the contrary indicate that satisfaction of
the conditions for exemption is a permissible means of avoiding price con-
trol.' 9 On the other hand, unless the exemption provision is applicable, the
Act purports to regulate any "sale or other disposal," which includes "con-
sumption or use . . . by a producer, and any transfer of title by the
producer other than by sale."' 20 Furthermore, the price provisions of the
Act may not be evaded "by or through the use of subsidiaries, affiliated
sales . . . companies or other intermediaries or instrumentalities." 2 1 Prob-
lems of classification thus assume greater significance. Where the producer
entirely owns or controls the captive mine, so that prices paid by consumer
to operator are bookkeeping entries, significant only to the tax gatherer, a
grant of exemption would not substantially contravene the price policy of
the Act. But many so-called captive arrangements for which exemption
is sought have a more direct relationship to price. Where the producer
corporation consists of interests different from those of the consumer, ex-
emption might offer for all practical purposes a means of evading established
minimum prices. The task for the courts, therefore, is to interpret the
exemption in a way which fulfills both parts of the equivocal policy of the
statute: that is, the exemption of some captive operations, and the sub-
jection of others, which have much the same economic effect, to the Act's
minimum price plan.
An arrangement under which coal is produced by employees of the con-
sumer from mines owned by him in fee clearly falls within the exemption
provision. There the consumer is a producer engaged in the business of
mining coal. For convenience, this arrangement. may be termed the "pure
18. This applies, apparently, not only to captive arrangements existing at the time
of the passage of the Act, but also to captive arrangements within ithe exemption nego-
tiated subsequently. Rejection of an amendment to the exemption subsection which would
have "frozen" the right to secure exempt captive arrangements as of the date of passage
of the Act supplies some further evidence to support this conclusion. See H. R. No. 578,
75th Cong.,olst Sess. (1937) 1, 8; 81 CoNe. REc. 3136 (1937).
19. See Hearings on S. 1, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 25-26. Cf. testimony of Judge
Warrum: "Take for instance and exclude captive coal from the operation of the alloca-
tion feature of this bill and from the Code provisions, and I think that would be followed
by a movement everywhere to lease mines for the purpose of operating them as captive
mines." Hearings on S. 1417, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 36. See also testimony of C.
H. Hosford, Jr., id. at 123.
20. §3(a) and (b).
21. §4-II-(g).
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captive" situation. Difficult problems of classification, however, arise with
respect to captive arrangements which deviate from the pure captive pattern.
Thus, the consumer's control of the mine may not be based on ovner-
ship in fee. It may be based on a part ownership of the fee, a long or short-
term lease of the mine, or a partial or complete stock control of a separate
mining corporation. Further, the actual work of extraction of the coal may
not be done by the employees of the consumer. It may be performed by
his agent, or by an independent contractor employed by him, or perhaps by
a subsidiary corporation nominally owning the physical properties.
In the recent case of Powell v. Gray.22 for example, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals was faced with the problem of classifying an arrangement
whereby a railroad company holding a year-to-year lease of mines employed
an independent contractor to extract coal for the use of the company. Prior
to the establishment of the lease and contract arrangement, the independent
contractor had been actively interested and engaged in the commercial opera-
tion of at least one of the mines leased by the railroad.2n The leases of the
mines and the agreement with tlie independent contractor matured at the
same time, both being renewable from year to year. It also appeared that
the leases and the contract were subject to termination at any time the
railroad could obtain coal on the open market at a price less than the amount
paid to the contractor plus royalties to the lessor, unless the contractor appro-
priately reduced his fee.2 4 Finding no "sale or other disposal" upon which
the price provisions of the Act might operate, the court held the arrange-
ment necessarily exempt. The criterion adopted to determine the question
of exemption or non-exemption was a comparison of the characteristics of
the transactions involved with those of the conventional sale and its attendant
title transfer.
22. 114 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). aff'd mcm., Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct. 824
(U. S. 1941), reh'g granted, 61 S. CL 938 (U. S. 1941) (assigned for hearing Octoer
13, 1941).
23. The independent contractor was an ex-president of an operating company which
had worked one of the mines taken over by the railroad pursuant to the agreement in
question. The contractor's wife was the majority stockholder in the operating company.
It appeared also that a second mine leased by the railroad and managed by the contractor
had been controlled by a company of which the contractor's brothers were managers. As
a term of the agreement, the contractor was bound, in the case of a breach of the condi-
tion subsequent and termination of the agreement by the railroad, to assume the leases
of the three mines. Record on Appeal, pp. 126-41, 536-44, Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct.
824 (U. S. 1941).
24. Record on Appeal, pp. 35-39, 126-31, 538-45, Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct. 82-4
(U. S. 1941). At the time of the appeal, the rate of compensation allegedly paid the
contractor varied from $1.63 to $1.705 per ton, according to the mine. This was paid at
a flat rate per ton with provision for adjustment with changing costs, and an option in
the railroad to pay at "cost plus 10%." The original rate on the contracts made in 1934
-approved as a permissible avoidance of the price terms of the NIRA-was about
$1.15 per ton. Cf. TNEC REP., supra note 5, at 297, 299: Before coordination the mini-
mum price found for locomotive fuel in price area one was S,2.15 per ton.
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The legal concept of sale, with its concomitant search for the passage of
title, however, seems a useless test for solving the classification problem. A
division among captive arrangements will serve the policy of the Act as fully
as possible by minimizing in some degree the number of transactions in
which less than minimum prices are charged. The Act consists of an attempt
to set and to police the enforcement of minimum prices for commerce in
coal.25 Agreed, therefore, that it applies only to commercial transactions
i.e., "sales"-of coal. But the test of "sale" for this purpose should not
be assimilated to the literature of the Uniform Sales Act. There is a sale
for purposes of the Coal Act, it may be suggested, if the purchaser's interests
in the nominal sales price are distinct from those of the seller. Identity of
interest should suffice to 'support the exemption, whether or not title to
the coal has passed for other purposes.
Until the decision in the Powell case, the scope of the exemption provision
in the operation of the Act had been generally limited. The Bituminous
Coal Division 26 appears to have taken the position that captive coal im-
munity is to be restricted to those consumer-producers who are engaged
in the mining of coal through their own employees. Thus the emphasis is
laid on the direct operation element in the "pure captive" situation. In the
Powell case, the Coal Division declared that the independent contractor was
not a railroad employee or agent, but a separate, independent entity and
that, therefore, the railroad was not the "producer" of the coal in question,
as that term is used in Section 17(c) of the Act.2 7 This doctrine, carried
over from cases involving tort and contract liability, fails to achieve the
policy of the Act in the present situation. A more appropriate ground for
the decision of the Coal Division probably may be found in its statement
that the railroad had not "become a 'producer'" but had "rather left their
25. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 392 (1940); North-
west Improvement Co. v. Ickes, 111 F. (2d) 221, 224 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
26. Bound about by rules requiring reasonable public notice, full hearing, and find-
ings of fact, the Coal Division is given "the power to make and promulgate all
reasonable rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions" of the Act, and
the findings of fact are made conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. § 2(a).
While judicial review of Coal Division rules and determinations is provided under § 6(b),
it may be that a review of a holding involving the exemption provision must be limited
to questions of constitutional power, statutory authority, and the basic prerequisites of
proof. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 400 (1940) ; Shields
v. Utah Idaho R. R., 305 U. S. 177, 180 (1938) ; United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105,
109 (1935) ; but see Consolidated Indiana Coal Co. v. Coal Comm., 103 F. (2d) 124, 128
(C. C. A. 7th, 1939) ; Mallory Coal Co. v. Coal Comm., 99 F. (2d) 399, 405 (App. D. C.
1938).
27. Doctrinally, a corporation could be such a "producer" only through its agents,
but an independent contractor is regarded for some purposes as an agent of the em-
ployer; in such case an identity might be found between the employer and the contractor
under the doctrine qui facit per allun facit per se. See RESTATEMENT, Aax~cy (1933)
§§ 1(d), 2(3), 2(b), 20, 220; cf. White Mt. Paper Co. v. Morse, 127 Fed. 643 (C. C. A.
1st, 1904).
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'consumer' position . . . unchanged." 28 Of course, every captive producer,
coming within or without the exemption provision, is primarily a consumer.
But the statement of the Director reveals a policy of preventing consumers
from assuming a temporary captive producer status as a part of a plan to
obtain, for the immediate present, a supply of coal at less than minimum
prices. This antipathetic attitude toward the short-term arrangement stems
from the desire to prevent evasion of the price provisions of the Act, and
protect the enhanced price structure of the commercial coal market. Thus
entrance into a short-term captive agreement, whatever its form, unlike the
purchase and direct operation of a mine in the pure captive situation, is
regarded as an attempted evasion within the prohibition of Section 4-II-(g .
Beyond this, the captive producer under a short-term arrangement is seen
to have an unfavorable influence upon the commercial coal market. Under
a short-term arrangement, and particularly under an arrangement subject
to termination at the option of the consumer, there is, the Coal Division seems
to say, a periodical possibility of either a return to purchasing coal in the
open market, or a re-exertion of pressure on independent coal operators to
enter into captive arrangements.20
While the courts which have considered the operation of the captive coal
provision have differed radically in their attitudes toward the granting of
exemptions, they have ostensibly utilized variations of the same test in solving
the classification problem. Favoring the grant of exemptions, the court in
Consolidated Indiana Coal Company v. Coal Connnission30 disregarded a cor-
porate entity in order to find a parent corporation which was consuming all the
coal produced by its subsidiary a "producer" within the immunity granting
section. Since it noted that the corporate entities were not maintained and that
sales by the subsidiary to the parent were bookkeeping transactions, the court
apparently used a "sale" test on the order of that employed in Powell v.
Gray. Here, however, the court went beyond the test used in the Powell
case by eliminating from the operation of the price provisions of the Act
transactions which were sales only in form. In Keystone Mining Company
v. Gray,3' on a similar set of facts, another court failed to find any ground
for ignoring the separate corporate entities. Finding a sale in form, and
basing its decision on the legislative history of the captive coal provision, it
refused to exempt the particular parent-subsidiary captive arrangement.Y -
28. Cited, Powell v. Gray, 114 F. (2d) 752, 754 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), aff'd incia.,
Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct. 824 (U. S. 1941), reh'g grantcd, 61 S. Ct. 938 (U. S. 1941).
29. See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 34-36, Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct. 824 (U. S. 1941).
30. 103 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
31. 120 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941). Cf. Northwest Improvement Co. v. Ickes,
111 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940).
32. An amendment specifically designed to broaden the exemptiun provision such
that the parent-subsidiary captive situation might be immunized was offered and rejected
during the final stages of the enacting process. See K R- R.r. No. 578, 75th Cong., 1st
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Despite the decision in the Keystone case, there would appear to be no sound
objection to exempting a transaction involving "book-entry sales" of the
entire production of a wholly-owned subsidiary to its parentaa In such case
there is an identity of interest between the supplier and the consumer units.
In the light of the general purposes of the Act to regulate commerce, the
transactions are "non-commercial," and hence, it would seem, outside the
purview of the Code provisions. Comparing the parent-subsidiary situation
to the admittedly exempt pure captive arrangement, there appears no
adequate ground for differentiation in treatment. The arrangements are
motivated by the same general considerations; captive production is con-
ducted in the same manner; and the effects of exemption upon the market
seem to be identical in both cases. If any exemptions are allowed, it is difficult
to see how they can be denied in cases where the consumer is purchasing
the output of a wholly owned subsidiary.
Because of the varying interpretations of the purpose and operation of
the exemption provision, the necessity of establishing uniform criteria for
classification becomes more immediate. Primarily, classification in each pat-
ticular case might be held to depend upon the effect of exemption or non-
exemption upon the minimum price policy of the Act. But the economic
consequences of the various arrangements are substantially the same. All
equally constitute a way of obtaining coal more cheaply and conveniently
than through open market purchase, particularly when market prices are high
relatively to operating costs. The problem posed by the Act, however, demands
limitation of the number of exemptions. In the interests of simplicity and
ease of administration, the most faithful enforcement will probably be pro-
vided by a rule which makes exemption as difficult and expensive to obtain
as possible. On the other hand, the captive coal exemption provision
expresses a secondary policy of the Act. Hence rules for classification must
be devised to reconcile the opposing considerations.
The operation of the Act, it has been found, is permissibly affected by the
pure captive situation. The predominant characteristic of the pure captive situa-
tion is the identity of interest of the supplier and the consumer. Having as
a joint, primary aim the most efficient production of coal for a supplying
of the consumer's needs, these two economic entities unite to "straddle the
market" for coal. Thus it appears that exemption of captive arrangements
wherein the supplier and the consumer of coal have an identity of interest
similar to that of the parties to a pure captive agreement will have only a
permissible effect on the operation of the Coal Act, and exemption will
properly be allowed. Conversely, captive agreements in which identity of
Sess. (1937) 1, 8; 81 CoNG. REc. 3136 (1937). The court held that the rejection of an
amendment forbids the reading of the Act as if it had the amended meaning. Keystone
Mining Co. v. Gray, 120 F. (2d) 1, 10 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), and cases cited.
33. See Excerpt from an Analysis by Chairman E. M. Douthat, 81 CONG. REC.
3013 (1937).
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interest is not found to be a significant element should not be held within
the provision.
Under this suggested standard, an arrangement whereby a consumer partly
owned a mine in fee, operated it through agents, and consumed its entire
output would probably be exempt. The degree of identity of interest between
the agent-supplier and the consumer-part owner would present no substantial
deviation from that in the pure captive situation, depending upon the con-
sumer's ownership share and the general circumstances surrounding the
arrangement. Thus an 80% ownership share in the fee would strongly
indicate an identity of interest between consumer and agent; but a 20% share
in the fee might not in itself be sufficient. Supplemented, however, by a
record of a number of years' operation of the property as a captive mine,
or by a contract with the other owners to take the entire production of the
mine for a given period, or by a contract of some length with tile agent
to operate the mine, the less substantial ownership might be adequate. In
the parent-subsidiary captive arrangement, there would be under this test
sufficient identity of interest to found exemption where the subsidiary was
wholly owned; or 80%o or 60% owned, in all probability. But fractional
ownership should require additional substantiating evidence.
The captive agreements raising the greatest problem of classificatior at the
present time are those involving leases of varying terms, and operations
through varying legal instrumentalities. Among these types of captive
arrangements, the short term lease-contract agreement of the Powell case
probably presents the weakest argument for exemption. Two principal con-
sequences follow from permitting exemption in short-term lease-contract
situations. Primarily, for reasons previously noted, consumers and inde-
pendent operators alike will seek the benefits of this temporary captive ar-
rangement.3 4 New extra-district competitive opportunities will thereby be
opened to all operators desirous of obtaining the stability of a captive operator
status,35 or seeking a captive agreement because of some competitive disad-
vantage in selling their coal at minimum prices on the open market.36 Under
the Coal Act, the enforcement of minimum prices tends to have an allocative
34. Since the Powell decision in the Circuit Court, the Coal Division has received a
number of applications for exemption (24 by March, 1941) on the same ground as there
involved. One of these applications related to a contract for only 6200 tons of coal. See
Application of 'Morgantown Glassware Guild, No. 1463FD, filed October 16, 1940; Brief
for Petitioners, p. 30, Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct. 824 (U. S. 1941). The Powell case
rule in operation appears to have an equitable operation as between the great and the
small consumer enterprise.
35. See note 16 supra.
36. A typical example is found in the case which involved the Bituminous Coal Pro-
ducers' Board for District 9, 'Madisonville, Kentucky. Here there was sought a change
in minimum prices at the mine such that West Kentucky Coal could compete in Mar-
ket Area 34, Evansville, Indiana, on a parity with Indiana coals. The petition was denied.
See Department of the Interior Release, C. D. 323, P. N. 151177, July 30, 1941. Thus a
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effect upon the distribution of production to different market areas, on a
basis of reflecting existing competitive relationships.3 7  In negotiating with-
out reference to established minimum prices, therefore, would-be captive
operators can compute the lease-contract "price" rate, or fee, on the basis
of actual costs of production, and can thus compete for captive arrangements
with consumers not within the particular price district established by the
Coal Division. Consequently, there will be some effect on the operation of
the price policy of the Coal Division, for the negotiation of extra-district
agreements will in some measure disturb production allocation. As a variation
of the same proposition, it is alleged that exemption of short-term arrange-
ments, with the resulting demand by consumers and competition among oper-
ators, would culminate in a race among the operators to obtain captive
engagements and thus save a part of the disappearing general market. In
the pure captive situation, competition on the captive agreement level and
disturbance of the operation of Coal Division price policy would occur, in
each case, only once within a certain, and probably extended, period of time.
In the short-term lease-contract situation, it is claimed, these influences would
be felt periodically, at the termination of each agreement.,38
But the importance of this effect may reasonably be discounted in view
of certain countervailing factors. In the first place, extra-district competition
on the captive arrangement level will be limited geographically by the im-
portance of freight rates as a cost factor in "price" to the consumer.89 Since
established minimum prices are somewhat attuned to the total of the different
production and sales costs,40 even the margin permitted by the captive ar-
producer located at the extremes of a marketing area, and under a freight-cost disad-
vantage, or one whose production is of the lowest quality in one classification range, will
also compete with difficulty. See Powbatan Mining Co. v. Ickes, 118 Fi. (2d) 105, 107
(C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
37. The "existing fair competitive opportunities" standard [Section 4-I1-(b)] for
minimum price determination, it has been found, "expresses a pervasive policy of the
Act." TNEC REP., supra note 5, at 379.
38. See Brief for Petitioners, pp. 34-36, Gray v. Powell, 61 S. Ct. 824 (U. S. 1941).
39. Freight rates often account for a larger part of the delivered price of coal than
the producer's return. TNEC REP., supra note 5, at 372-73; see PARXER, TuE COAL
INDUSTRY (1940) 39-44. Markets are localized because of the low unit value of coal
when compared to the high unit cost of its freight. NAT. RESOURCES Comi., op. cit. supra
note 16, at 79.
40. Pursuant to the order of the Secretary of the Interior, May 3, 1941, hearings
are being currently held to establish new minimum prices (Docket 21, Bituminous Coal
Division). However, since it had already been determined at the time of the order that
there was "an average national reduction of 18 cents per ton" in production costs over
the period August, 1940 to May, 1941, it is apparent that the incentive to make cap-
tive arrangements remains strong within the different marketing areas. See Depart-
ment of the Interior Release, C. D. 205, P. N. 139700, May 3, 1941. In view of the pres-
ent upward trend, it is possible that the decrease of unit overhead costs consequent upon
the predicted 1941 10% increase in production will invalidate the new price schedules
before they are put into effect. See Department of the Interior Release, C. D. 278, P. N,
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rangement rapidly disappears and captive operation becomes unprofitable
with increases in the distance from mine to consumer. Of course, this limita-
tion is less operative in the railroad supplying field, where the consumer's
freight charges are part of its own operating costs. 4 1 But, in the light of
this limitation, the anticipation of a rush by operators to enter unprofitable
captive agreements presumes the willingness of numbers of operators in
each different marketing area to make contracts, binding for substantial
periods, which do not cover cost components of price. While individual sales
at a loss were common prior to the establishment of the minimum prices
under the Code, it is doubtful that contracts involving the entire produc-
tion of a mine, even for the short period of one year, would be negotiated
on the same basis. Thus the much-debated allocative feature of the Coal
Division's price policy 43 will be but negligibly impaired, if at all, by permitting
short-term lease-contract exemptions.
The second and more important effect of permitting short-term lease-
contract exemptions is that transactions involving a very large volume of
coal would thereby be removed from the operation of the Code sections of
the Act. This would curtail the influence and effectiveness of the Coal Division
in its function of price determination and establishment of marketing rules
and regulations, for the coal base to which such prices and regulations would
be applicable would be greatly reduced.44 Similarly, the burden of the expense
of administering the Code would fall more heavily upon the remaining Code
members. Finally, exemptions widely granted on the basis of one-year captive
agreements permit a recurring possibility of the return of large captive
producers to the open market as purchasers or as prospective captive em-
ployers. Such a threat hanging over the market would have an influence
147920, June 29, 1941. This raises one of the basic criticisms of the Act and its price
machinery: the "lag" of price determination and establishment behind shifting cost con-
siderations. TNEC REP., supra note 5, at 316-18.
41. The railroad transports coal used in carrying on its business at cost to itself,
without violating the provisions of the Hepburn Act, 34 ST.AT. 585 (190b), 49 U. S. C.
§ 1 (8) (1934) ; 29 Ors. ArY. GEN. 587 (1912).
42. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 395 (1940) ; Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 330 (1936) ; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U. S. 344, 361-64 (1933) ; TNEC REP., supra note 5, at 254.
43. See Rostow, Bituminous Coal and the Public Interest (1941) 50 YuX L. J.
543, 613; Hamilton, Coal and the Economy-A Demnurrer (1941) 50 YAiaM L. J. 595.
44. In 1940 there were produced in districts 1 to 15, 28,898,807 tons of "exempt"
coal, and 55,254,061 tons were disposed of by "controlled" sales, or sales "other than by
an arms' length transaction." The total, 84,152,868 tons, comprises the trade version of
captive production; should all this coal be exempted under the captive cual provi-
sion, even without further conversion of independent operators to an exempt captive-
operator status, approximately 20% of the total production in districts 1 to 15 would
escape Code regulation. R-vsED DETAIL OF PRODUCING, AMD ISTATIVE AND S.NG
CosTs FoR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1940, op. cit. supra note 2; see NAT. Bun.xu or Ecol;.
RESEARcH, REPORT ON PRICES IN THE BiTUMINous COAL. INrDUsTRY (1938) 8-9 (20 tu
25% of total tonnage).
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subversive of the avowed aim of the statute to effect "stabilization of the
industry."' 45 This disturbing effect is not found in the pure captive situation,
where a shift back to the market is more difficult because of the stabilizing
influence of the substantial investment by the consumer in coal mining
facilities.46 Hence a grant of exemption in the short-term lease-contract
situation of the Powell case will have an effect upon the operation of the
Act substantially more adverse than that arising from pure captive exemp-
tions. Briefly described, the evils to be anticipated from exemptions of short-
term lease-contract arrangements are created principally by the impermanence
of the relationship. In other words, absence of a well-established identity
of interest between the consumer and the supplier reveals the true nature
of the agreement as an alternative form of sales contract, contingent merely
upon market price and thus lacking the essential characteristics of the captive
arrangements contemplated for exemption.
Tested further by the identity of interest rule, however, it is apparent
that lease-contract arrangements in general need not categorically be denied
exemption. An agreement designed for a longer term might well satisfy
the test. In such case the lessee-consumer might have a substantial interest
in common with the supplier, and he with the consumer, even though the
supplier were formerly an independent operator of the mine. 7 As the term
of the agreement is increased, the community of interest becomes more stable,
and therefore more significant. Whether lease-contracts should be designed
to have operation for two, or ten, or twenty years, or longer in order to
raise a sufficient identity of interest is a controversial question embracing
matters of economic and political policy. Its determination under the sug-
gested identity of interest rule would be made, after a full hearing before
a board acquainted with the field,48 upon a consideration of all the circum-
stances.
In operation, the identity of interest criterion for determination of the
classification question would be applied to the facts of each captive situation
as of the time of the petition for exemption. 49 The easily established facts
of the legal relations which form the basis of the agreement would be primarily
influential. Thus the direct relationship of the consumer to the mine on a
substantial investment basis or by an important contract commitment will
tend to establish an identity of interest between the consumer and the
supplier. Similarly, an agreement binding the supplier to the consumer as
45. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 388 (1940); see Appa-
lachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 364 (1932) ; Hamilton, supra note 43,
at 609-10, n. 23, 24. Cf. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 (1898).
46. Shutting down of captive mines in order to purchase below cost in the open mar-
ket is no longer an alternative in view of the enforcement of minimum prices.
47. See notes 23 and 24 supra.
48. See note 26 supra.
49. Procedure for obtaining exemptions is described in ATToRtEY GENERAi's Com-
miTE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, Monograph 10 (1941) Pt. 10, pp. 39-53.
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an employee, agent, or independent contractor over a lengthy period will
have significance. On the other hand, the possibility of termination of the
arrangement on the occurrence of certain conditions subsequent, r'o or through
the exercise of an option by either party, will be a countervailing factor.
But provisions for periodic renewal of agreements and adjustment of the
fee to costs may give supplementary indication of requisite identity of interest
in certain cases. Other elements may also lie found significant with respect
to the duality of interest: the history of the negotiations which gave rise to
the agreement, the respective bargaining positions from which the parties
negotiated, and the coal record of the consumer and the supplier.
Finally, the requirement of a substantial identity of interest as a requisite
to exemption under the captive coal provision will virtually assure a limitation
of the total numbers of exemptions permitted. This will naturally result as
the alternative burdens of large investment or assumption of relatively lung
term commitments discourage the so-called captive arrangements which are
manifestly contingent on market price. Strict application of the rule should
be subject, however, to a consideration of the possible discriminatory effect
to be anticipated from rigid limitations on grants of exemption. Thus,
finding an identity of interest only in the circumstances of a pure captive
situation would effectually withhold the advantages of captive exemption
from the less affluent consumer, who could not afford the investment or the
risk of direct ownership and operation of a mine. Such an inequitable
operation of the exemption provision is to be avoided where this is possible
consistently with the more elemental considerations heretofore set out.5'
Generally, a policy limiting exemptions seems consonant with the operation
of the provision apparently intended by Congress. The practical validity of
direct marketing,52 acknowledged by the Act in the exemption provision,
is recognized under the identity of interest rule (and the limitation upun
exemption which is the necessary concomitant thereof) yet the principal ends
of the Act will obtain.
The ultimate solution of the problem of classification must be found, there-
fore, in a consideration of the legal relations and the special circumstances
surrounding the production-consumption arrangement in each individual case.
50. See note 23 supra.
51. It might also be argued that the enforcement of minimum prices, as a result of
refusing exemption in the lease-contract case, would require allocation of the price bU-
tween the lessor and contractor, in violation of the right of freedom of contract insured
by the Fifth Amendment; or that Congress did not intend a regulation of costs uf pro-
duction, as this allocation would seem to entail, but only prices in commerce. See At-
lanta v. Coal Commission, 26 F. Supp. 606. 610 (D. Cul. 1939), aff'd, 308 U. S. 517
(1939); Nebbia v. New York. 291 U. S. 502. 525 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parish, 300 U. "S. 379, 391 (1937). But see (1940) 27 VA. L. RLv. 117.
52. See BURNs, THE DECLINE OF COMPErITION (1936) 431-45; 4 DEwz:~e, FI:,N-
CIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1920) 55-56; EcKEL. CQAL, IFoN. AND WAn (1920)
255-61.
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